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Abstract 
 
We present a new approach to analyse historical recovery rates on distressed bank assets. Our 
approach uses banks’ reported impaired assets and the corresponding specific provisions. The 
dynamics and drivers of this credit loss recovery proxy are studied for a comprehensive 
sample of Australian banks from 1989 to 2005. We find that macroeconomic and bank-
specific factors influence banks’ estimates of loan loss recoveries, consistent with banks 
smoothing their earnings. In contrast with findings based on prices of distressed corporate 
bonds, banks record lower recoveries in years of strong economic growth.  
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1.  Introduction 
 
The stability of the banking sector is of major importance for economic outcomes. Banks 
form the backbone of modern economies and instability in the banking sector can pose 
problems to the economic system as a whole. Credit losses, or more generally, asset quality 
problems, have repeatedly been identified as a key trigger of bank failures, e.g. Graham and 
Horner (1988), Caprio and Klingebiel (1996). Accordingly, much research effort has gone 
into developing methods for assessing credit risk both at a systemic and bank-specific level. 
 
Two major components determine the extent of a credit loss suffered: first, the probability of 
a default (PD) and, second, the loss given default (LGD), which equals one minus the 
recovery rate in the event of default. Most credit risk literature has focussed on estimating 
PD; much less attention has been devoted to estimating characteristics of LGD. We address 
this lack of research by analyzing the determinants of LGD (or, more specifically, the 
recovery rate) using a comprehensive sample of Australian banks. 
 
The paucity of research on LGD has been changing in recent years as the new Basel Capital 
Accord (Basel II) enables banks to employ their own proprietary risk models to calculate 
capital adequacy. Schuermann (2004) and Altman (2006) provide a comprehensive review of 
these LGD studies, many of which are authored by rating agencies (e.g. Gupton et al., 2000; 
Verde, 2003; Keisman, 2004; Moody's Investors Service, 2008). These studies analyse 
recovery patterns of defaulted corporate bonds; likewise there is research into the recovery of 
syndicated corporate loans (Asarnow and Marker, 1995; Emery et al., 2004). Results for both 
corporate bonds and syndicated loans are similar with seniority of the claim and 
collateralization (secured vs. unsecured lending) impacting the rate of recovery. Given that 
syndicated loans typically represent senior lending, have stricter covenants and are also 
mostly secured in the samples studied, their median level of recovery is generally found to be 
much higher than unsecured bonds. 
 
A related stream of research investigates the correlation between PD and LGD. The 
consensus of these studies is that there is a negative correlation between the two variables 
with low (high) recovery rates in times of high (low) defaults (Frye, 2000; Altman et al., 
2003; Hu and Perraudin, 2006). 
 
The research into characteristics of LGD is for the most part based on price data of defaulted 
bonds and in some cases of traded bank loans because such data is readily available. 
Accordingly, these analyses are not based on comprehensive samples of non-traded loans 
which represent the bulk of assets for many banks and where there is no market value of 
distressed debt shortly after default. Nor are they based on realized recoveries but rather 
assume that market prices are an efficient reflection of the present value of all future 
recoveries on these claims. Research on actual recoveries exists for traditional, non-traded 
bank loans but is typically limited to smaller proprietary bank specific data samples (e.g. 
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Asarnow and Edwards, 1995; Eales and Bosworth, 1998; Araten et al., 2004; Miu and 
Ozdemir, 2006). In the context of the Basel II implementation, banks have started building 
their LGD databases but these are not in the public domain. Moreover, anecdotal information 
indicates that these data typically cover just a few years, and data have not been collected in a 
consistent and standardized fashion through time. 
 
This paper presents an alternative method for gaining insights into the dynamics of recovery 
rates for distressed bank lending over longer periods of time, i.e. through economic cycles. 
Since the late 1980s, banks of most developed countries have reported on the level of loans 
and other assets considered impaired from a credit risk perspective. Moreover, banks not only 
report the gross book value of these assets but typically also their expected realizable value 
thus providing a point in time estimate of overall recovery rates of their total distressed asset 
portfolio. These values can be interpreted as a proxy for expected recoveries by bank 
management just as the distressed price based methods represent market expected recovery 
values of corporate bonds. The main benefit of the method is that recovery estimates are for a 
representative composition of bank distressed credit exposures rather than the specific bond 
portfolios of the traditional bond LGD literature. It also enables analysis over longer periods 
and mirrors outcomes for the whole system, not just a single bank. 
 
We apply the method to explore determinants of recovery rates for a comprehensive panel 
dataset of 18 Australian banks for the period 1989 to 2005. We consider two groups of 
explanatory variables. One includes idiosyncratic factors specific to the bank and its risk 
profile, the other aggregate macroeconomic drivers with systemic impact on asset recoveries. 
We find that the macroeconomic factors act in the opposite direction for bank loans relative 
to their effect on corporate bonds found in the traditional distressed price based literature. 
This latter result implies that banks may use reported recovery rates as a method to smooth 
their earnings over the cycle. Our estimation utilises three different methods to test robustness 
of key results.  
 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the data used in the study, including some 
background on the Australian banking system. Section 3 formulates the hypotheses, and 
presents the test methodology, empirical results and robustness tests; section 4 concludes. 
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2.  Background and Data 
 
During the period under consideration, the Australian banking system has undergone major 
structural changes. The 1980s saw the initiation of major sector reforms (Campbell Inquiry, 
1981). The various types of financial institutions such as trading banks, savings banks, state 
banks, trust banks and building societies were initially subject to carefully delineated sets of 
legislation, but a substantial blurring between their activities had occurred. The liberalization 
of the financial system saw the creation of common rules for bank registration. The 
regulatory regime in the latter half of the period is relatively ‘hands-off’ compared with a 
considerably more interventionist system early in the period (Wallis Inquiry, 1997, p. 567-
597; Davis, 2004, p. 9-15). 
 
The observation period covers the major banking system crisis which occurred in 1990/1991. 
The state banking system was affected by the 1991 demise of both the State Bank of South 
Australia (later absorbed into a predecessor of St. George Bank) and State Bank of Victoria 
(amalgamated into Commonwealth Bank of Australia). Other Australian banking firms also 
suffered during these years, most notably market leader Westpac following its involvement in 
some high profile failed commercial real estate projects.1  
 
The fallout of the system crisis led to a substantial re-shaping of the banking scene. All 
Commonwealth and state government owned institutions were privatized and in most cases 
later absorbed into other banks. Australia’s banking market concentration saw the emergence 
of four leading banking groups (ANZ, CBA, NAB and Westpac). 
 
This paper utilises a database of financial and credit loss information for a sample of 
Australian banks for the period 1980 to 2005 which was compiled in and discussed by Hess 
(2008). The data have been retrieved from original bank reports of all Australian banks 
excluding (1) institutions that are predominantly wholesale and/or merchant banks and (2) 
non-bank financial institutions. To construct the asset recovery proxy, one needs information 
about the level of impaired bank assets (gross value) and the corresponding estimate of 
expected realizable value. The realizable value as a percent of gross impaired assets is the 
implied recovery rate on distressed bank assets (see the Appendix for more background on 
the construction of this proxy). The first bank to provide such information was National 
Australia Bank (NAB) in 1982. 
 
Table 1 provides information about the 18 banks in the sample and the availability of relevant 
asset recovery data. Figure 1 plots the times series of implied recovery rates for the four 
major Australian banks. Our investigation utilizes recovery rates from 1989 onwards when 
numerous banks started reporting this item. 
                                                 
1
  Westpac’s cumulative write-offs from 1990 to 1993 represented about 8% of loans outstanding. 
See Carew (1997) and Davidson & Salisbury (2005) for an account of Westpac’s crisis. 
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Table 1.  Overview of Banks in Database and the Availability of Recovery Data 
Bank identifier Bank full name Institution earlier name Successor Registered Recovery data
AU AdelaideBk Adelaide Bank Co-operative Building Society of 
South Australia
AU BendigoBk 1994 to 2008 1992-2005
AU AdvanceBk Advance Bank NSW Building Society AU StGeorge 1985 to 1998 1989-1995
AU ANZ ANZ Banking Group 
(AUS)
whole period 1989-2005
AU BendigoBk Bendigo Bank Bendigo Permanent Land and 
Building Society
1995 to present 1995-2005
AU BkMelbourne Bank of Melbourne RESI Statewide Building Society AU Westpac 1989-1998 1990-1996
AU BkWest Bank West Rural & Industries Bank of Western 
Australia
HBOS, AU 
CoWthBk since 
2008
whole period 1991-2004
AU BoQ Bank of Queensland whole period 1992-2005
AU ChallengeBk Challenge Bank Hotham Permanent Building 
Society (Vic)/ Perth Building
AU Westpac 1987 to 1996 1989-1995
AU Colonial* Colonial / Colonial State 
Bank
Colonial Mutual Life Assurance 
Society, took over AU SBNSW
AU CoWthBk 1995 to 2001 1995-1999
AU CoWthBk Commonwealth Bank whole period 1984-2005
AU EldersRural Elders Rural Bank Limited 2000 to present 1999-2005
AU NAB National Australia Bank National Bank of Australasia whole period 1982-2005
AU PIBA Primary Industry Bank of 
Australia
Rabobank 
Australia
1987 to 2003 1989-1993
AU SBNSW* State Bank of New South 
Wales
Rural Bank of New South Wales AU Colonial to 1994 1990-1994
AU SBSA State Bank of South 
Australia
The State Bank of South Australia AU Advance 
Bk
to 1994 1990-1994
AU StGeorge St.George Bank St.George Building Society AU Westpac 1993 to 2008 1992-2005
AU Suncorp Suncorp Metway Bank renamed 
Suncorp in 2002
1988 to present 1991-2005
AU Trustbk TAS Trust Bank Tasmania SBT Bank (The Savings Bank of 
Tasmania), Hobart Savings Bank
AU CoWthBk to 1999 1992-1998
AU Westpac Westpac (AUS) Bank of New South Wales whole period 1985-2005  
 
Notes: 
*AU SBNSW and successor AU Colonial are treated as one time series in this empirical research. 
 
The following banks, operating earlier in the observation period, were omitted from the sample due to 
missing data: Commercial Banking Company of Sydney Limited, Commercial Bank of Australia, 
State Bank of Victoria, Tasmania Bank. 
 
All data are annual. 
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Figure 1.  Implied Recovery Rates (RCV_IA) of Major Australian Banks 
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Movements in macroeconomic variables are likely to affect asset quality and thus recovery 
values. Two indicators are used as explanatory variables for the cyclical state of the economy, 
GDP growth (GDPGRW) and the change in the rate of unemployment (ΔUNEMP); we 
employ these variables alternatively given the high correlation between them over the sample 
(ρ= -0.87). Asset market developments may also affect asset quality and borrowers’ cash 
flows, consequently impacting on the value of collateral held by banks. We concentrate on 
three asset market variables, the percentage change in the housing price index (HPGRW), the 
return on the national share index (RET_SHINDX) and changes in real interest rates 
(REALINTGRW).
2
  
 
Controls are required for bank-specific drivers of recovery rates since we are dealing with a 
heterogeneous sample of banks that ranges from small regional mortgage lenders to multi-
line internationally diversified institutions. We focus on the institution’s net interest margin 
(NIM). In part, NIM can be viewed as a proxy for the institution’s risk appetite. If risk 
appetite were the key determinant of NIM, we would expect a high NIM to be associated 
with lower recoveries in the event of default as the result of a riskier loan book. However, 
NIM is negatively correlated (ρ= -0.30) with the institution’s share of system loans 
(SH_SYSLNS) implying that smaller (generally retail focused) banks have wider margins 
than do larger banks (reflecting operational costs of retail banking). In this circumstance, we 
would expect a high NIM to be associated with a higher recovery rate given retail banks’ 
reliance on traditional home lending with solid collateral in the event of default. Given the 
negative correlation between NIM and SH_SYSLNS, we expect this latter (positive) 
relationship between NIM and the recovery rate to predominate. 
 
                                                 
2
  Earlier work also considered CPI inflation, a constituent part of nominal interest rates, but the 
additional term did not yield robust results. 
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To account for other bank characteristics, including potential behavioural influences on 
provisioning levels, we include a bank’s earnings before taxes and loan loss provisions as a 
proportion of its average total assets (EBTP_AS) as an explanatory variable. It has been 
argued that management has an incentive for smoothing reported income by means of 
discretionary provisions (seminal work by Greenawalt and Sinkey Jr., 1988). Specifically we 
hypothesise that management in banks with good (poor) current performance relative to 
future performance will ‘save’ income for (‘borrow’ income from) the future by reducing 
(increasing) current income through loan loss provisions (Kanagaretnam et al., 2003). 
Provisions enter the construction of the dependent recovery rate proxy (inverse relationship), 
so this hypothesis calls for a negative coefficient on the earnings proxy.3  
 
Table 2 provides a description of each of our explanatory variables, including their 
hypothesised effects. Table 3 provides descriptive statistics for the aggregate macroeconomic 
and bank-specific series. 
 
 
Table 2:  Description of Variables and Expected Impact on Recovery Rates 
 
 Variable name Acronym Expected sign
Dependent variable    
Implied recovery rate 1 minus (specific provisions as a 
proportion of total impaired assets) 
RCV_IA n.a. 
Explanatory variables 
Macroeconomic variables 
   
Economic cycle 
 
Real GDP growth 
Unemployment rate (p.p. change) 
GDPGRW  
UNEMP 
+ve 
-ve 
 
Asset price movements Housing price index (% change) HPGRW +ve 
 Share index (% change) RET_SHINDX +ve 
 Point change in real interest rates REALINTGRW -ve 
    
Bank-specific variables    
Bank characteristics Net interest margin  NIM +ve 
 Earnings before taxes and 
provisions (as % of average assets)  
EBTP_AS -ve 
                                                 
3
  Further bank specific proxies have been explored. We included SH_SYSLNS as an alternative 
variable to NIM (given the correlation between them); results for other variables were little 
changed. We found no significant effects from the inclusion of a bank’s cost-income ratio, or a 
proxy for the risk characteristics of a bank’s loan portfolio (the ratio of the bank’s Basel I housing 
loans to total loans). Accordingly, these results are not incorporated here. 
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Table 4.   Descriptive Statistics (1989 to 2005)* 
Acronym Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std Dev Obs 
GDPGRW 3.3% 3.7% 5.4% -0.7% 1.4%   17 
HPGRW 6.1% 5.0% 18.0% -4.2% 6.3%   17 
REALINTGRW -0.1% -0.3% 4.5% -2.8% 1.7%   17 
RET_SHINDX 6.32% 7.09% 19.28% -7.92% 7.50%   17 
ΔUNEMP 0.01% -0.50% 2.39% -1.61% 1.07%   17 
RCV_IA 63.8% 64.6% 95.6% 2.7% 15.1% 189 
NIM 2.9% 2.7% 6.8% 0.6% 0.8% 189 
EBTP_AS  1.6% 1.6% 8.8% 0.3% 0.7% 189 
*The bank-specific series (RCV_IA, NIM, EBTP_AS) each include 18 cross-sections. 
 
3.  Empirical Model and Results 
We conduct a pooled cross-section time-series analysis on our bank sample,
4
 initially treating 
it as a dynamic panel; subsequently we examine two alternative model formulations. The 
dynamic panel approach includes a lagged term of the dependent variable as an explanatory 
variable, reflecting the observation that the levels of estimated recoveries are ‘sticky’ as 
management adjusts its assessment of recovery only gradually as new information comes to 
light (the correlation coefficient between current and lagged RCV_IA is ρ=0.77). Similar 
models are used in macro-prudential literature to explore the dynamics of credit losses in 
banking (e.g. Salas and Saurina, 2002; Pain, 2003). Accordingly, we initially estimate a 
model of the form: 
 
)1(__ ,
1
,,1,0, ti
N
k
tkiktiti uxIARCVIARCV ++= ∑
=
− ββ  
 
where tiIARCV ,_  is the dependent variable, realizable value as a percentage of gross 
impaired assets for bank i in year t. On the right hand side of the equation are the lagged 
dependent variable plus N potential explanatory variables, x, from the list of variables defined 
in Table 2; tiu , ~ (0, σ
2) is the error process. 
 
The presence of the lagged dependent variable in the dynamic model raises particular issues 
for panel estimation procedures. This is because any time-invariant bank-specific effect, 
which shows up in the error term, will be correlated with the lagged dependent variable. As a 
result OLS and GLS procedures will produce biased and inconsistent coefficient estimates. 
                                                 
4
  Earlier research on this data sample, examining drivers of credit losses, showed that Australian 
banks have responded similarly to common variables (Hess et al., 2009). 
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To overcome this correlation between the errors and the lagged dependent variable, we apply 
the Arellano and Bond (1991) generalised method of moments estimator which optimises 
across the available set of instruments to produce consistent parameter estimates for the 
dynamic model.  
 
We begin with a model incorporating aggregate macro and bank-specific variables discussed 
in section 2. To avoid problems of multicollinearity, we include either the GDP growth rate 
(GDPGRW) or the change in the unemployment rate (ΔUNEMP) separately as the 
macroeconomic indicator. The resulting estimates are presented in the first two columns of 
Table 4. As well as the macroeconomic variables discussed above, we include each of the 
real interest variable (REALINTGRW), the two asset market proxies for the share and 
housing markets (RET_SHINDX and HPGRW respectively),
5
 the bank’s net interest margin 
(NIM), and the bank’s earnings proxy (EBTP_AS).  
 
Table 1.  Estimation Results 
 
Dependent 
Variable RCV_IA RCV_IA RCV_IA RCV_IA D_RCV_IA D_RCV_IA 
Estimation 
Method GMM GMM OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Fixed Effects 
(Y/N) N N Y Y N N 
Explanatory 
Variables  
RCV_IA (-1) -0.059* -0.028     
GDPGRW -2.002***  -1.106*  -12.676***  
ΔUNEMP  1.884***  1.553*  19.323*** 
REALINTGRW -1.506*** -1.538*** -1.204* -1.153* 6.773 7.887 
RET_SHINDX 0.159*** 0.135*** 0.022 0.045 -1.533 -1.309 
HPGRW -0.003 -0.043 0.086 0.059 0.553 0.178 
NIM 14.576*** 11.495*** 4.935*** 4.696*** 9.829 7.675 
EBTP_AS -5.813*** -3.363*** -3.161** -3.034** 6.770 7.093 
Observations 168 168 198 198 181 181 
R2 n.a. n.a. 0.582 0.528 0.055 0.062 
1st order auto-
corr., p-value 0.602 0.224 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Durbin-Watson  n.a. n.a. 0.998 1.008 2.016 2.026 
Notes:  ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent levels, respectively. Estimation is for 
observation period 1989 to 2005 for 18 banks (see Table 1). Variables are explained in Table 2 (other than 
D_RCV_IA, defined in the Appendix, Part 2); constant not reported. GMM equations estimated as a dynamic 
panel with first-difference estimation as cross-section effects method, GMM weighting according to White 
period system covariances (Arellano-Bond 2-step/n-step). All t-statistics use White period standard errors (d.f. 
corrected). Indicated OLS equations are estimated with cross-section fixed effects (Fixed Effects = Y). 
 
                                                 
5
  We have estimated the equations variously with RET_SHINDX and HPGRW both included, and included 
separately; results are very similar and so we only report the results where both variables are included. 
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Our GMM results pertaining to the determinants of expected bank loan recoveries are 
distinctly different from prior results relating to corporate bond recoveries. Studies of the 
latter generally find depressed recoveries in years of weak economic growth (Fridson et al., 
2000; Frye, 2000, p.13; Carey and Gordy, 2004). By contrast, our results indicate that bank 
loan recoveries are higher (lower) in years of economic contraction (growth). The 
coefficients on both GDPGRW and ΔUNEMP are significant at the 1% level.  
 
Behavioural factors within banks possibly lie behind these results. For one, efforts to recover 
defaulted debt in a good year could be hampered by the organisation’s focus on growing the 
lending portfolio; i.e. debt recovery may not be the focus of management in a boom phase. 
Conversely, tough economic times may see the build-up of specialist debt work-out capacity 
and collateral requirements might be more strictly enforced. 
 
Another explanation for this result (consistent with Hess et al., 2009) is that bank 
management may use its discretion to set credit loss provisions in line with their own 
interests (noting that our recovery proxy has been constructed using the banks’ own specific 
provisions). A number of studies have observed earnings smoothing patterns when banks put 
off provisions in bad years while using their discretion to provision for high levels of bad 
debt in good years (see literature reviewed in Lobo and Yang, 2001, p. 225-227). If 
management understates provisions in a downturn, their implicit recovery estimate will be 
inflated. This interpretation is supported by negative (and significant) coefficients on the 
bank specific earnings proxy (EBTP_AS), consistent with earnings management practices. 
This second behavioural interpretation would imply that bank management uses its discretion 
mainly with regard to specific provisions but not the level of impaired assets which also 
enters the calculation of the recovery proxy but does not have a direct impact on bank 
earnings.  
 
While the property price proxy (HPGRW) is not significant, strong share market performance 
(RET_SHINDX) does appear to positively influence bank management’s expectation of asset 
recoveries. The share price is a readily observable indicator that may be a leading indicator of 
economic cycles, although the latter property is far from conclusive (e.g. Pearce, 1983). 
Nevertheless, the equity market may have a ‘mood effect’ with bull and bear markets 
affecting the subjective assessment of recovery values by banks. Such mood effects have 
been documented in psychology (Wright and Bower, 1992) and have been blamed for 
contributing to the recent economic crisis as risk managers inappropriately calibrated their 
risk models.  
 
The GMM results indicate that changes in real interest rates have a significant negative 
impact on recoveries. Banks might find it genuinely difficult to collect bad debts in an 
environment of rising interest rates. An alternative interpretation is that a time of rising 
interest rates often coincides with an economic growth phase with tight monetary policies 
(confirmed by the correlation coefficient between REALINTGRW and GDPGRW of 
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ρ=0.32.) Our interest rate result proxy might thus be another manifestation of the effect for 
GDPGRW.  
 
Bank specific control parameters are significant at the 1% level. Wide net interest margin 
banks are typically small, retail focussed institutions. Such institutions exhibit, on average, 
higher recovery rates, consistent with these banks concentrating on traditional home lending, 
typically with solid collateral values. The negative coefficient for the earnings proxy 
EBTP_AS is consistent with an earnings smoothing motive. It is also consistent with the 
effects of ‘signalling through loan loss provisions’ (Beaver et al., 1989). Wahlen (1994) 
offers evidence that bank managers appear to increase the discretionary component of current 
loan loss provisions when future cash flow prospects are expected to improve. It is argued 
that the bank thus signals strength to the market because it is able to provision more 
conservatively than its peers. 
 
One surprising feature of the dynamic GMM results is that the coefficient on the lagged 
dependent variable is close to zero and is not significant at the 5% level in either equation. To 
test the robustness of our empirical results to alternative dynamic specifications, the model of 
equation (1) has been estimated with two alternative formulations.  
 
First, we estimate the equations using a static specification (i.e. excluding the lagged 
dependent variable) using OLS (an appropriate estimator in this case). For this static 
specification we include bank fixed effects (a Wald test of these terms rejects the null 
hypothesis that they are redundant at less than 0.1%). These fixed effects control for 
underlying unchanging bank-specific characteristics within the sample. The results are 
presented in columns 3 and 4 of Table 4 with t-statistics calculated using robust White 
diagonal standard errors (White, 1980) given the equations’ low Durbin-Watson statistics (of 
approximately 1). The results are similar to those of the GMM estimates. Coefficients on the 
main macro variables (GDPGRW, DUNEMP, REALINTGRW) remain significant (albeit 
now at the 10% level), although the other asset price variables are not significant. The bank-
specific controls, NIM and EBTP_AS, remain consistently significant. 
 
The insignificance of the lagged recovery rate in the GMM specification runs counter to our 
hypothesis that estimated recovery rates tend to be sticky across years, and this result could 
be due to weak instruments available for the GMM estimation. The significant 
autocorrelation of residuals in the static OLS specification indicates that some degree of 
stickiness in recoveries is actually observed in practice. We test the robustness of our results 
with an alternative dynamic specification, adopting a transformation of the dependent 
variable derived by manipulating the definition of RCV_IAit and of its lag. The resulting 
dependent variable, derived explicitly in Part 2 of the Appendix, results in our estimating the 
determinants of the change in recoveries scaled by the bank’s gross impaired assets. This 
variable is denoted D_RCV_IAit, and is defined as:  
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D_RCV_IAit ≡ RCV_IAit - (Git-1/Git) RCV_IAit-1    
 
where Git is bank i’s gross impaired assets at time t. If the level of gross impaired assets is 
identical across periods, D_RCV_IAit is simply the change in our levels recovery variable.  
 
Columns 5 and 6 of Table 4 present the results with D_RCV_IAit as the dependent variable. 
In this case, since we are estimating a change variable, we do not include bank fixed effects. 
Consistent with the prior results for the macroeconomic variables, we again find strong 
counter-cyclical effects on recoveries (the coefficients for GDPGRW and DUNEMP are both 
significant at the 1% level). Other variables are not significant once the dependent variable is 
essentially differenced, i.e. the differencing effectively captures the influence of the bank 
specific effects. The Durbin-Watson statistic of approximately 2.02 in each equation indicates 
that this specification of the dependent variable does capture the essential dynamics of the 
recoveries process. Even with this differencing, our core conclusion that banks’ expected 
recoveries are counter-cyclical, remains intact. 
 
6.  Conclusions 
 
Our findings indicate that banks’ expected recovery rates improve in bad economic times, 
contrary to existing literature analysing defaulted bond (rather than bank loan) recoveries that 
has predominantly found the reverse relationship. The recovery proxy used in this study is 
based on a bank’s own estimate of impaired assets and corresponding credit loss provisions. 
These estimates may be formulated in line with bank management’s own interests, in 
particular to smooth earnings and/or to signal strength through generous provisioning.  
 
Real interest rate increases may affect the level of recoveries (negatively) but do not affect 
the change in recoveries, while other asset price variables do not have a consistent effect on 
recovery rates. Banks with high net interest margins (predominantly retail banks) tend to have 
high expected recovery rates, although changes in recovery rates are not affected by this 
margin. Banks with high earnings ratios report lower expected recovery rates (potentially 
consistent with an earnings smoothing motive) but their changes in recovery rates are 
unaffected by this influence.  
 
Overall, our findings indicate that projected recovery rates for bank loans are affected 
strongly by the economic cycle, in a manner that is inconsistent with the cycle’s effect on 
corporate bond recovery rates. Our recovery proxy reflects the subjective judgement of bank 
management concerning expected recoveries, and such expected outcomes, by their nature, 
reflect forward-looking judgements. ‘Fundamentals’ also play a part. For instance, 
(predominantly retail) banks with high net interest margins have higher expected recovery 
rates, consistent with high quality collateral backing for their loans (e.g. for housing 
mortgages). The nature of such loans may help to explain the difference between our results 
(for bank loans) and those of other studies with respect to corporate bonds. This contrast in 
14 
 
results reflects either differing fundamental behaviour in recoveries for alternative loan types 
or the differing latitude of bank management to apply judgement to their own loans relative 
to the market’s judgement on corporate bonds.  
 
Our sample predominantly covers the ‘Basle I’ period; i.e. prior to the introduction of the 
Basle II standards and the introduction of IFRS (International Financial Reporting Standards), 
both of which have changed provisioning standards. An extension of the current study could 
analyse whether banks’ judgements regarding estimated recoveries has changed with the 
introduction of these new standards. In addition, application of our approach to other markets 
with a wide array of banks (e.g. the USA) could indicate whether the relationships that we 
have determined are general across (all or certain types of) banks or are specific to the 
Australian banking market.  
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Appendix 
 
Part 1: Construction of Recovery Rate Proxy 
 
Under Australian accounting standards in force since the early 1990s, a bank raises a specific 
provision as soon as a loan has been identified as doubtful and when the estimated repayment 
realisable from the borrower is likely to fall short of the amount of principal and interest 
outstanding. Such loans are then reported as part of the bank’s impaired assets and typically 
constitute the major component included under this accounting item. There are other, usually 
smaller, asset categories included under impaired assets. For example, Australian Prudential 
Regulation Authority (APRA) guidelines for classifying impaired assets also require banks to 
include restructured assets where the original contractual terms have been modified to 
provide for concessions of interest or principal for reasons related to the financial difficulties 
of the customer. While the precise definitions of what constitutes an impaired asset might 
have changed through time, they can essentially be considered as distressed or defaulted 
assets on which the bank provides a best estimate of a loss given default (LGD) in the form of 
a specific provision.  
 
We can use the approach above to construct the expected recovery rate proxy (RCV_IA) as 
follows: 
 
assetsimpairedGross
provisionsSpecificIARCV −=1_      (A1) 
 
RCV_IA thus provides us with a time series of net realizable value expressed as a % of gross 
defaulted bank assets for a diversified portfolio of bank assets subject to credit risk. 
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Part 2: Alternative Dependent Variable  
 
In order to estimate an equation with no lagged dependent variable, while recognising the 
‘stickiness’ in recoveries over time, we manipulate the definition of RCV_IA, from (A1) 
above, so as to include the lagged impact of recoveries within the dependent variable. The 
derivation is as follows (where the i subscript is dropped for convenience). Define:  
Rt ≡ RCV_IA in year t; St ≡ specific provisions in t; and Gt ≡ gross impaired assets in t. Then 
from equation (A1): 
 
     Rt   = 1 – St/Gt        (A2) 
 
     Rt-1 = 1 – St-1/Gt-1        (A3) 
 
Hence:   ΔRt  = St-1/Gt-1 – St/Gt         
  = St-1/Gt-1 – [(St-1 + ΔSt)/(Gt-1 + ΔGt)] 
  = [St-1(Gt-1 + ΔGt) – St-1Gt-1 - ΔStGt-1] / [Gt-1(Gt-1 + ΔGt)] 
  = [St-1ΔGt – ΔStGt-1] / [Gt-1(Gt-1 + ΔGt)] 
  = [St-1(ΔGt/Gt-1) - ΔSt] / Gt 
  = [(St-1ΔGt) / (Gt-1Gt)] – [ΔSt / Gt]  
  = [(1-Rt-1)ΔGt / Gt] – [ΔSt / Gt]  
 
Hence:    Rt = Rt-1 + [(1-Rt-1)ΔGt / Gt] – [ΔSt / Gt]  
 = (1 - ΔGt/Gt)Rt-1 + [(ΔGt - ΔSt) / Gt]     
 
Thus:      Rt - (Gt-1/Gt)Rt-1 = [(ΔGt - ΔSt) / Gt]     (A4) 
 
We adopt [Rt - (Gt-1/Gt)Rt-1] as a dependent variable; the explanatory variables then explain 
the change in expected recoveries, i.e. (ΔGt - ΔSt), as a ratio of gross impaired assets. The 
dependent variable is denoted D_RCV_IA in the paper. 
 
